ORDER REQUIRING GOOD FAITH CONFERRAL AND REVIEW OF PROCEDURES RELATED TO CIVIL DISCOVERY MATTERS July 17, 2024 (2024)

Case

GATLIN, JOHN STEVEN vs. GATLIN, SHERRY ANN

Jul 15, 2024 |ROBERTS, RUSSELL |SIMPLIFIED DISSOLUTIONS |24000895DR

Case

INNOVATIONS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION vs. NELSON, GERALD RANDELL

Case

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE vs. ANDERSON, GEORGE EUGENE

Case

RIOS CARABALLO, JOHN LUIS vs. NA

Jul 15, 2024 |YOUNG, BRANDON |SIMPLIFIED DISSOLUTIONS |24000900DR

Case

LOPEZ, IAN ALEXIS vs. SYBAL, JENOLYS LUANAURI MOREL

Jul 17, 2024 |COLLIER, DEVIN |OTHER DOMESTIC RELATIONS |24000909DR

Case

THE ESTATE OF: MAHAN, MARILYN J

Jul 18, 2024 |SMILEY, ELIJAH |PETITION FOR FORMAL ADMINISTRATION |24000749CP

Case

DOHERTY, JACQUELINE K vs. DOHERTY, KEVIN R

Case

RAY, RAYWAT P vs. EDMUNDSON, CANDICE

Jul 17, 2024 |ROBERTS, RUSSELL |PATERNITY/DISESTABLISHMENT OF PATERNITY |24000917DR

Ruling

Valerie McDuffie vs. Ahmad Faizi

Jul 12, 2024 |C23-02161

C23-02161CASE NAME: VALERIE MCDUFFIE VS. AHMAD FAIZI*HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL FILED BY VALERIE MCDUFFIEFILED BY:*TENTATIVE RULING:*Hearing required.

Ruling

GUADALUPE ENCISO VS AVANTI HOSPITALS, LLC DBA EAST LOS ANGELES DOCTORS HOSPITAL

Jul 18, 2024 |19STCV07692

Case Number: 19STCV07692 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 39 HEARING DATE July 18, 2024 CASE NUMBER 19STCV13012 MOTION Motion to Reopen Discovery MOVING PARTY Plaintiff Guadalupe Encisco OPPOSING PARTY Defendant Avanti Hospitals, LLC MOTION Plaintiff Guadalupe Encisco (Plaintiff) moves to reopen discovery related to Plaintiffs recent surgeries. Defendant Avanti Hospitals, LLC (Defendant) opposes the motion. The court previously considered this matter and, in its order of June 25, 2024, continued it to July 17, 2024 for the parties to submit discovery plans in compliance with this courts March 1, 2024 order. ANALYSIS In determining whether to reopen discovery, the court must consider the necessity of and reasons for the additional discovery, the diligence or lack thereof by the party seeking to reopen discovery in attempting to complete discovery prior to the discovery cutoff date, whether permitting the discovery will prevent the case from going forward on the trial date or will otherwise prejudice any party, and any past continuances of the trial date. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.050, subd. (b).) Plaintiff moves to reopen discovery as to surgeries Plaintiff underwent on January 8 and 11, 2024. (See March 17, 2024 Declaration of Raymond Ghermezian (in support of and attached to motion), Exhibit A.) This is a proper basis to reopen discovery. Plaintiff proposes to provide updated medical records to Defendant, to submit to a second session of deposition, and to respond to additional written discovery concerning Plaintiffs surgeries and updated medical issues. (Plaintiffs Proposed Discovery Plan.) Defendant agrees Plaintiffs proposed discovery is necessary but contends Defendant will also need to propound subpoenas for updated medical and pharmacy records, depose Plaintiffs surgeon regarding her surgical care, prognosis, and future care needs, and have Plaintiff sit for an updated orthopedic examination with Defendants expert. (Defendants Proposed Discovery Plan.) The court finds Defendants proposed discovery plan is reasonable and necessary for Defendant to fairly defend this action. However, the court notes Defendant did not include discovery in 2025 in its proposed deadlines, but rather jumped from November 30, 2024 to March 26, 2026. The court assumes this was a clerical error. The court, therefore, grants the motion, subject to Plaintiffs stipulation to submit to Defendants proposed discovery plan, with all proposed deadlines in 2026 corrected to reflect deadlines on the proposed dates in 2025. The court notes, pursuant to the courts order of December 5, 2023, the five-year date for this case is June 26, 2026. The court also conditions its grant of this motion on the parties stipulation to continue the trial date to a date prior to June 26, 2026. Plaintiff is to give notice of this order and file proof of service of same.

Ruling

FCS057573 - PEREZ, HEIDI JUDITH VS BOOKER, WESLEY (DMS)

Jul 15, 2024 |FCS057573

FCS057573Motions for ContemptTENTATIVE RULING:Petitioner’s “motions” for contempt are denied.No affidavit of the facts constituting any contempt has been presented to thecourt. The filing of a sufficient affidavit is a jurisdictional prerequisite to acontempt proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1211(a); Koehler v. Superior Court(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169; Oil Workers Int’l Union v. Superior Court(1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 512, 541.) Page 1 of 1

Ruling

JAMES BERG VS WRIGHT MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, INC., ET AL.

Jul 17, 2024 |24SMCV02124

Case Number: 24SMCV02124 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Berg v. Wright Medical Technology Inc., et al. CASE NO.: 24SMCV02124 MOTION: Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice HEARING DATE: 7/17/2024 LEGAL STANDARD California Rules of Court, rule 9.40 provides that an attorney in good standing in another jurisdiction may apply to appear pro hac vice in this State by way of written application upon due notice to all interested parties, as well as service on the State Bar in San Francisco with payment of a $50.00 fee, so long as that attorney is not a resident of California, does not work in California and does not perform regular or substantial business, professional or other activities in the State. The written application must provide the following information: (1) The applicant's residence and office address; (2) The courts to which the applicant has been admitted to practice and the dates of admission; (3) That the applicant is a licensee in good standing in those courts; (4) That the applicant is not currently suspended or disbarred in any court; (5) The title of each court and cause in which the applicant has filed an application to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this state in the preceding two years, the date of each application, and whether or not it was granted; and (6) The name, address, and telephone number of the active licensee of the State Bar of California who is attorney of record. (CRC Rule 9.40(d).) ANALYSIS Counsel George E. McLaughlin applies for admission pro hac vice in order to represent Plaintiff James Berg. Counsel provides all the required information. (CRC Rule 9.40.) The Court will allow counsels admission pro hac vice. That said, the Court notes that admission pro hac vice is not a right. Counsel states that he has represented clients in four other California cases in the preceding two years. In light of this frequency of representation, further pro hac vice applications may be appropriately denied at the discretion of the court. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.

Ruling

ALMA NIEVA-PEREZ VS EHUD LEVY, ET AL.

Jul 15, 2024 |23STCV02627

Case Number: 23STCV02627 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. TENTATIVE RULING DEPT: 32 HEARING DATE: July 15, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 23STCV02627 MOTIONS: Motion to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoena MOVING PARTY: Defendants Ehud Levy, 1621 Westerly Terrace, LLC, and Alexander Henry Levin OPPOSING PARTY: None BACKGROUND Defendants Ehud Levy, 1621 Westerly Terrace, LLC, and Alexander Henry Levin (Defendants) now move to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena for medical records served on non-party Paramount Family Health Center. Defendants also seek sanctions. No opposition has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD A party seeking discovery from a person who is not a party to the action may obtain discovery by oral deposition, written deposition, or deposition subpoena for production of business records.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.010.)¿ A deposition subpoena may command either: (1) only the attendance and testimony of the deponent, (2) only the production of business records for copying, or (3) the attendance and testimony of the deponent, as well as the production of business records, other documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.020.)¿ A service of a deposition subpoena shall be affected a sufficient time in advance of the deposition to provide the deponent a reasonable opportunity to locate and produce any designated documents and, where personal attendance is commanded, a reasonable time to travel to the place of deposition.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.220, subd. (a).)¿ Personal service of any deposition subpoena is effective to require a deponent who is a resident of California to: personally appear and testify, if the subpoena so specifies; to produce any specified documents; and to appear at a court session if the subpoena so specifies.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.220, subd. (c).)¿A motion to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena must be made within 60 days after completion of the deposition record. (Code Civ. Proc., §2025.480, subd., (b); Board of Registered Nursing v. Sup.Ct. (Johnson & Johnson) (2021) 59 CA5th 1011, 1032-1033.) California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, subdivision (a) states, [i]f a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the courts own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2, subdivision (a) states, in relevant part, . . . in making an order pursuant to motion made . . . under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorneys fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification . . . . MEET AND CONFER The Declaration of Christopher Babadjanian, Defendants counsel, states the following: On March 28, 2024, I sent a meet and confer letter to the COR for Paramount Family Health Center requesting compliance with the subpoena within 14 business days. I advised that failure to comply with the subpoena by this deadline would force my office to seek court intervention. (Babadjanian Decl. ¶ 11, Exh. F.) As of the date of this declarations signing, I have not received a response to my February 15, 2024, meet and confer letter. (Id. ¶ 12.) DISCUSSION On March 7, 2024, Defendants personally served a deposition subpoena on Paramount Family Health Center. (Babadjanian Decl. ¶ 9, Exh. E.) The date of production was March 25, 2024. (Id.) To date, no response has been provided and no opposition has been filed. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to compel. Defendants seek $1,240.51 in monetary sanctions, representing a $160.17 hourly rate, $125 to personally serve the motion, and the $60 filing fee. This also includes $500 in sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1992. While the Court finds that sanctions are warranted, the amount requested in excessive given the lack of opposition and type of motion at issue. Therefore, the Court awards sanctions in the amount of $345.17 (1 hour of attorney time, $91.50 to personally serve this motion, and the $60 filing fee). CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court grants the motion for order compelling compliance with the deposition subpoena. The Custodian of Records for Paramount Family Health Center is ordered to produce the documents identified in the deposition subpoena at its place of business by August 5, 2024. The Court further grants Defendants request for monetary sanctions in the reduced amount of $345.17 against Paramount Family Health Center. Said monetary sanctions shall be paid to counsel for Defendants within 30 days. Defendants shall give notice of the Courts order and file a proof of service of such.

Ruling

Figueroa vs. State of California (Department of Social Services), et al.

Jul 15, 2024 |22CV-0200829

SOCIAL SERVICES), ET AL.Case Number: 22CV-0200829This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of default and trial setting. This case wasfiled in October of 2022, but is still not at issue. Doe Defendant La-Z-Boy Incorporated was servedon December 4, 2023, but has not yet appeared. The Court has received and executed a stipulatedorder re filing of a Second Amended Complaint. The Court will therefore continue this matter 60days to allow said Complaint to be filed and served. The Court continues this matter to September16, 2024 at 9:00 p.m. in Dept. 64. The parties are to file with the Court a Status ConferenceStatement 5 days prior thereto. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Ruling

RAOUL RENFROE, ET AL. VS GOLDEN MOTEL, ET AL.

Jul 17, 2024 |20STCV13591

Case Number: 20STCV13591 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT RAOUL RENFROE, et al., Plaintiff(s), vs. GOLDEN MOTEL, et al., Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 20STCV13591 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO ENFORCE SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF ANNORA RENFROE AND COUNSEL Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. July 17, 2024 ) This is the second of two motions filed by defendant Wangs Golden Enterprises, Inc. dba Golden Motel (Defendant) asking the Court to enforce monetary sanctions of $1,120 previously imposed against plaintiff Annora Renfroe (Plaintiff) in a minute order dated January 26, 2024 issued by the Honorable Lisa R. Jaskol (January 26 Order). Although the January 26 Order did not impose sanctions against Plaintiffs counsel, Defendant argues that Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel should be jointly liable for $5,000 due to their failure to comply with the January 26 Order. The motion is DENIED because no additional court order is necessary to enforce an order imposing sanctions. (Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615 [monetary sanctions orders have the force and effect of a money judgment, and are immediately enforceable through execution, except to the extent the trial court may order a stay of the sanction.]) Moving party to give notice. Dated this 17th day of July, 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Ruling

ELOISA VILLA VS WAYNE EUGENE REDMOND

Jul 17, 2024 |24STCV06048

Case Number: 24STCV06048 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Case Name: Eloisa Villa v. Wayne Eugene Redmond Case No.: 24STCV06048 Motion: Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint Moving Party: Defendant Wayne Eugene Redmond Responding Party: Plaintiff Eloisa Villa Tentative Ruling: Defendants Demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. This case is a criminal legal malpractice[1] action filed by client Eloisa Villa (Villa/Plaintiff) against attorney Wayne Eugene Redmond (Redmond/Defendant). The Complaint alleges that Redmond represented Villa when Villa was criminally charged with assault in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4) and aggravated mayhem in violation of Penal Code section 205. The Complaint alleges that Redmond negligently advised Villa to plead guilty to Penal Code section 205. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) As a result, Villa was imprisoned for almost five years longer than she would have been. (Id.) Defendant demurs to the Complaint. Plaintiff filed opposition to which Defendant replied. In opposing the demurrer, Plaintiff misrepresents the facts and disregards the law. Because Plaintiff fails to plead, and cannot in good faith plead, actual innocence, and cannot show postconviction exoneration, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. Judicial Notice Redmond filed a Request for Judicial Notice (RJN), requesting that the Court judicially notice a Minute Order dated March 8, 2022 in the case of People of the State of California v. Elois Maria Villa, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. PA0873324. The request is granted. Likewise, Villa files their own RJN with their opposition, requesting the Court grant judicial notice to the court reporters transcript of court proceedings regarding the resentencing of Villa in the same case. The request is granted. Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer&the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a).) Attached to their demurrer, Redmond includes the Declaration of Stephen R. Rykoff which states that Defense counsel sent a letter to Plaintiffs counsel on April 24, 2024, however, there is no indication that any communication occurred in-person or telephonically. Therefore, the requirements remain unsatisfied. However, per Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41(a)(4), A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) To state a cause of action for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must plead (1) the duty of the attorney to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as members of his or her profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the attorneys negligence. (Kumaraperu v. Feldsted (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 60, 66, quotation marks omitted.) In addition, in a criminal malpractice proceeding, the plaintiff must prove actual innocence (Wiley v. County of San Diego, supra, 19 Cal.4th 532, 545 (Wiley).) and reversal of her conviction or other exoneration by postconviction relief. (Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1194, 1201 (Coscia).) These are the two elements that Villa fails to plead and cannot prove. Discussion Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Redmon negligently advised plaintiff to plead guilty to violation of Penal Code section 205 - aggravated mayhem . . . (Compl., ¶ 6.) Based on the transcript of the proceedings, however, that is untrue. Plaintiff did not plead guilty to section 205, but to Penal Code section 203, ordinary mayhem. As reflected in the minute order of the pretrial hearing in Plaintiffs criminal case, the prosecution moved, and the court ordered, an amendment to the information to read violation of 203 PC instead of 205 PC. As the minute order reveals, Ms. Villa pleads nolo contendere with the approval of the court to a violation of Section 203 PC in count 02. The court finds defendant guilty.[2] Plaintiffs Complaint is therefore inaccurate that Defendant Redmond advised Ms. Villa to plead guilty to Penal Code section 205 or that she did so. Thus, the fundamental premise of the malpractice action is erroneous. In opposition to the demurrer, Plaintiff simply ignores these facts. Rather, Plaintiff appears to contend that the plea amounted to some sort of post-conviction relief. Plaintiff Villa argues: Because the court recognized the error of the prior charge, there was post-conviction relief, the effect of which was the implied finding of actual innocence of violation of Penal Code section 205. Thus, Plaintiff continues to insist that she pleaded guilty to aggravated mayhem when she did not, and that the amendment of the plea to ordinary mayhem for which she was found guilty was an implied finding of actual innocence. Plaintiff appears to confuse her plea to Penal Code section 203 with different proceedings, about one year later, in which the People moved to recall the sentence, and permitted her to plead guilty to violation to Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4) also a felony, and be resentenced, to which the Court agreed. In what the trial court characterized as a resentencing, Ms. Villa pleaded nolo contendere to assault likely to produce great bodily injury, with an aggravating factor. That is reflected in the transcript submitted by Plaintiff. Her Complaint fails to state a cause of action, however, because Plaintiff has not pleaded actual innocence or an exoneration. More to the point, she cannot prove either actual innocence or exoneration, because she was found guilty because of her nolo contendere plea to the assault charge, involving the same incident. She admitted her guilt not actual innocence and she was sentenced for a felony not exonerated. This was neither a finding of actual innocence nor an exoneration. In her Opposition memorandum Plaintiff argues that a specific underlying finding of actual innocence is not required; rather, only a record of post-conviction relief is required. Just as she misstated the facts in her Complaint, Plaintiff misconceives the law. To establish a legal malpractice claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate both actual innocence and post-conviction exoneration. (Sangha v. LaBarbera (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 79, 84-86 [to maintain a legal malpractice action against a former attorney in a criminal proceeding, Plaintiff must demonstrate actual innocence and postconviction relief (capitalization omitted)](Sangha).) In Wiley, supra, our Supreme Court held that in a criminal malpractice action actual innocence is a necessary element of the plaintiffs cause of action. (19 Cal.4th 532, 545.) Among the policy considerations underlying this requirement was that permitting a convicted criminal to pursue a legal malpractice claim without requiring proof of innocence would allow the criminal to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong&. (Id. at p. 537. Reasoned the high court, [o]nly an innocent person wrongly convicted due to inadequate representation has suffered a compensable injury&. (Id. at p. 539.) Three years later, the Supreme Court, relying on the same policy considerations as discussed in Wiley, held that in order to show actual innocence in a legal malpractice action, a former criminal defendant must obtain postconviction exoneration. In Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, supra, 25 Cal.4th 1194, 1201, the Court explained that the convicted individual must obtain reversal of his or her conviction or other exoneration by postconviction relief& This does not include a resentencing based on a plea to a different felony, as was granted to Ms. Villa. Rather, the Supreme Court explained, the plaintiff must obtain postconviction relief in the form of a final disposition of the underlying criminal case for example, by acquittal after retrial, reversal on appeal with directions to dismiss the charges, reversal followed by the Peoples refusal to continue the prosecution, or a grant of habeas corpus relief as a prerequisite to proving actual innocence in a malpractice action against former criminal defense counsel. (Id. at p. 1205.) Although Plaintiff claims that her resentencing amounted to an exoneration, she offers no authority for this proposition. On its face, a nolo plea to a felony is not an exoneration, and cannot prove actual innocence. The Court of Appeal has addressed cases similar to this one, when a nolo plea is entered to a lesser included offense, or to an offense arising from the same circ*mstances. In those cases, the appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite elements for a criminal malpractice claim. In Sangha v. LaBarbera, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 79, plaintiff accused his criminal defense attorney of negligence for advising him to plead to felony vandalism. He succeeded in having the plea set aside and instead pleaded guilty to misdemeanor vandalism. In the malpractice proceeding, the trial court granted the former lawyers motion for summary judgment because plaintiff failed to show postconviction exoneration and could not establish actual innocence. The Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the rationale of Wiley and Coscia requires a plaintiff in a criminal legal malpractice case to show actual innocence and postconviction exoneration on any guilty finding for a lesser included offense&. Sangha is instructive here. In that case, the only guilty plea was to a misdemeanor; Ms. Villa pleaded nolo to a felony. Nevertheless, the plea to the lesser charge was not deemed an exoneration, and was the opposite of a finding of actual innocence. A similar result was reached in Wilkinson v. Zelen (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 37 (Wilkinson). Plaintiff Wilkinson was convicted of a felony and two misdemeanors, which were later vacated. Pursuant to a plea bargain, she entered no contest to two misdemeanors. In Wilkinsons malpractice case, the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend because she did not plead she was factually innocent and she was not exonerated by postconviction relief. (Id. at p. 39.) The case different slightly from Sangha ̧ because while Wilkinson pleaded to misdemeanors that were transactionally related offenses, they did not qualify as included offenses. The Court of Appeal held that Wilkinson must be exonerated of all transactionally related offenses in order to satisfy the holding in Coscia. Because the judicially noticed facts unequivocally demonstrate that Wilkinson plead[ed] no contest to two offenses transactionally related to the felony charge&she cannot in good faith plead exoneration. (Id. at 48.) Here, Plaintiff Villa pleaded no contest to a felony charge assault that was originally one of the two counts she was charged with, obviously transactionally related. She is not factually innocent; she has not been exonerated. Wilkinson also explained why denying leave to amend after sustaining the demurrer was correct. (Wilkinson, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 49.) Villa has the burden to demonstrate how she can amend the complaint. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Here, as in Wilkinson, given the immutable facts, [Plaintiff] cannot in good faith plead factual innocence of a crime or exoneration. (Wilkinson, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 49.) Conclusion Defendants Demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. [1] Criminal malpractice refers to legal malpractice in the course of defending a client accused of a crime. (Wiley v. County of San Diego (1998) 19 Cal.4th 532, 536, fn. 1.) [2] In the criminal proceeding, Ms. Villa was also charged with violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4), assault upon a person by means likely to produce great bodily injury, a felony. When she pleaded nolo contendere to Penal Code section 203, the assault charge was dismissed. As discussed below, in later proceedings, based on the prosecutions motion, Ms. Villa withdrew her plea to the mayhem charge, pleaded nolo contendere to the section 245, subdivision (a)(4) assault charge, with aggravated circ*mstances, and was resentenced to the high term under the assault statute, which is four years.

Document

SOLANO CASTILLO, REINALDO vs. RICHARDS, CORY TAYLOR

Document

STRICKLAND, MYRUS vs. JOHN DOE MEIDCAL GROUP

Jul 16, 2024 |MALPRACTICE EXTENTION |24000625CA

Document

DORRIS, RUSTY D vs. MEDICAL STAFF AND PERSONNEL OF BAY COUNTY JAIL

Jul 18, 2024 |MALPRACTICE EXTENTION |24000639CA

Document

SOLANO CASTILLO, REINALDO vs. RICHARDS, CORY TAYLOR

Document

DORRIS, RUSTY D vs. MEDICAL STAFF AND PERSONNEL OF BAY COUNTY JAIL

Jul 18, 2024 |MALPRACTICE EXTENTION |24000639CA

Document

STRICKLAND, MYRUS vs. JOHN DOE MEIDCAL GROUP

Jul 16, 2024 |MALPRACTICE EXTENTION |24000625CA

Document

MARCOTTE, VICKIE vs. WEBB, JOSIE

Jul 19, 2024 |GOODMAN, JAMES J JR |NEGLIGENCE PREMISES LIABILITY RESIDENTIAL |24000641CA

Document

MARCOTTE, VICKIE vs. WEBB, JOSIE

Jul 19, 2024 |GOODMAN, JAMES J JR |NEGLIGENCE PREMISES LIABILITY RESIDENTIAL |24000641CA

Document

MARCOTTE, VICKIE vs. WEBB, JOSIE

Jul 19, 2024 |GOODMAN, JAMES J JR |NEGLIGENCE PREMISES LIABILITY RESIDENTIAL |24000641CA